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Be Smart & Stay Safe Volume 15 Issue 2
IN SERVICE: 10-8
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms became law on April 17, 1982. That was 33 years 
ago. Since then, the Courts have been interpreting the Charter and considering how it impacts 
Canadian law. Equally, if not more difficult, is applying this developing jurisprudence to the 
myriad of circumstances as they arise in life. Well, that is exactly what the police must do. It is 
their duty to sometimes take abstract constitutional notions and principles (such as privacy) and 
apply them to daily reality, often in a heartbeat, with little time for reflection, second opinion or 
timeouts. The call a police officer makes on the street is the one that they, and others, must live 
with. Training  and education is key! That is why “In Service: 10-8” is now in its 15th year of 
publication. We salute all of our readers and thank them for all that they do in maintaining 
public safety is this great nation.
Charter Turns 33
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WHAT’S	 NEW	 FOR	 POLICE	 IN	 
THE	 LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Canadian organizational behaviour.
Steven L. McShane, Sandra L. Steen, Kevin Tasa.
Whitby, ON: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2014.
HD 58.7 M33 2014
Demarginalizing  voices: commitment, emotion, 
and action in qualitative research.
edited by Jennifer M. Kilty, Maritza  Felices-Luna, and 
Sheryl C. Fabian.
Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2014.
HM 571 D44 2014
Diversity in  coaching: working  with gender, 
culture, race and age.
edited by Jonathan Passmore.
London, UK; Philadelphia, PA: Kogan Page, 2013.
HF 5549.5 C53 D58 2013
Emotionally intelligent leadership: a guide for 
students.
Marcy Levy Shankman, Scott J. Allen, Paige Haber-
Curran.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2015.
LB 2346 E469 2015
Fundamentals of social research.
Earl Babbie, Lucia Benaquisto.
Toronto, ON: Nelson Education, 2013.
H 62 B223 2013
How we learn: the surprising  truth about when, 
where, and why it happens.
Benedict Carey.
New York, NY: Random House, 2014.
BF 318 C366 2014
In the line of fire: how to handle tough 
questions--when it counts.
 Jerry Weissman.
Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2014.
HF 5718.22 W449 2014
Present with impact and confidence.
Amanda Vickers and Steve Bavister.
London, UK : Teach Yourself, 2010.
HF 5718.22 V53 2010
Show me the numbers:  designing  tables and 
graphs to enlighten.
Stephen Few.
Burlingame, CA: Analytics Press, 2012.
HF 5718.22 F49 2012
Social media marketing for dummies.
by Shiv Singh and Stephanie Diamond.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015.
HF 5415.1265 S56 2015
The 27 challenges managers face: step-by-step 
solutions to (nearly) all of your management 
problems.
Bruce Tulgan.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, a Wiley brand, 2014
HD 30.3 T85 2014
The art and science of workplace mediation.
Blaine Donais.
Toronto, ON: Carswell, 2014.
HD 5481 D66 2014
The complete volunteer management handbook.
Steve McCurley, Rick Lynch and Rob Jackson.
Liverpool, UK: Directory of Social Change, 2012.
HN 49 V64 M33 2012
The non-designer's design book: design and 
topographic principles for the visual novice.
Robin Williams.
San Francisco, CA: Peachpit Press, 2014
Z 246 W634 2015
www.10-8.ca
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The Canadian Association of Police Educators (CAPE) promotes excellence in law 
enforcement training  and education through the guidance of innovative research, program 
development, knowledge transfer, network facilitation, and collaborative training 
initiatives. In the changing  landscape of police training  many agencies are stretching their 
resources to do more with less. The goal of the 2015 CAPE conference is to promote 
discussion on hot topics in police training, highlighting collaboration as a mechanism to 
achieve effective and defensible training within the current economic climate.  
Sessions at the conference are designed to be short, fast-paced presentations followed by 
facilitated group discussions, panel discussions, or question and answer sessions with 
panelists to promote interaction and critical thinking. Innovations in police training in BC 
will be showcased throughout the conference and scheduled updates from various 
organizations and committees will promote collaboration. 
CAPE 2015
Canadian Association of Police Educators
Effective & Defensible Training Through Collaboration
Conference: May 20-22, 2015
Pre-conference Workshop: May 19, 2015
715 McBride Boulevard 
New Westminster, BC
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Canadian Association of Police Educators
Effective & Defensible Training Through Collaboration
Conference: May 20-22, 2015
Pre-conference Workshop: May 19, 2015
Presentation topics at the 2015 CAPE Conference include:
• Hot topics in police training:
✓ Mental readiness
✓ Two-tiered policing
✓ The Economics of policing
• Training for Vancouver’s Downtown East Side
• The JIBC continuum of training
• Assessing in the real world:
✓ Outcomes based assessment
✓ Reality-based training and assessment
✓ Blended learning: e-learning for outcomes based assessment
• Developing provincial standards:
✓ BC’s Certified Use of Force Instructor Course (CUFIC)
✓ BC’s Firearms working group
✓ Police Services Division – working towards provincial standards in BC
• Assessment Centre
• National Training Inventory
• Collaboration in Police Training
• BC’s Crisis Intervention and De-Escalation training
A limited-capacity pre-CAPE workshop on curriculum mapping will be offered May 19, 
2015 where participants will work directly with the BC Police Academy Curriculum 
Developer to map their curriculum to the Police Sector Council National Framework of 
Competencies.  
There will also be opportunities to network and exchange ideas in an informal setting.
cape-educators.ca
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WITHOUT	 PRIVACY	 INTEREST,	 
NO	 STANDING	 TO	 CHALLENGE	 
SEARCH
R. v. Steele, 2015 ONCA 169
At about 2:00 am, a  police officer 
decided to stop a vehicle and check 
for proper documentation and driver 
sobriety. Although she could see a 
driver, she could not tell their gender 
or skin colour nor whether there were any other 
occupants. After pulling  the vehicle over and 
approaching  the driver’s door, she noticed there 
were four black men in the car, including  the 
accused seated as a front passenger. She called for 
back up and three other officers arrived. They stood 
at each of the vehicle’s other doors. When asked, the 
driver produced the ownership  papers and several 
expired insurance pink slips but could not produce a 
driver’s licence. He said the car belonged to his 
friend’s mother. Although cooperative and making 
efforts to find proof of insurance, he appeared 
nervous. The accused, seated up front, also seemed 
nervous. He had also been hunched over with his 
hands underneath the passenger seat as if he were 
trying  to hide something. The officer asked the driver 
if he would like her to help  him find the  valid 
insurance slip. He agreed. The other occupants, 
including  the accused, were asked to get out of the 
car while  the driver remained in the driver’s seat. The 
officer went to the front passenger side of the car. 
She knelt on the ground and looked inside the glove 
box for the insurance slip  but could not find it. As 
she rose to leave, she saw part of the butt and barrel 
of a gun on the  floor partially under the front 
passenger seat. The gun was a loaded, prohibited, 
semi-automatic firearm. Weapons charges followed.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
It was agreed that the accused’s mother 
was the owner of the car and had lent it 
that day to the driver and the accused, 
her son. The judge concluded that the 
initial stop of the vehicle was authorized under 
Ontario’s Highway Traffic Act (HTA), which permits 
random stops to check driver and vehicle 
documentation, and driver sobriety. He also found 
the HTA gave police officers the power to search the 
vehicle for proof of insurance  and that the accused 
had no standing  to challenge the driver’s consent to 
the search of the vehicle. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence of racial bias or racial profiling. When the 
officer saw the car she could not see  the race or 
gender of the driver, or any other occupants of the 
vehicle. She only determined the number of 
occupants and their race after she stopped the car. 
As well, when she  went to the front passenger side 
and looked into the glove box, she was “intent on 
finding  that valid insurance slip”. Finally, even if 
there  had been a Charter violation, the evidence was 
admissible  under s. 24(2). The judge found that the 
accused knew the gun was there, was trying  to hide 
it from police, and was exerting  a measure of control 
over it. He was convicted of possessing  a loaded, 
prohibited, semi-automatic firearm. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
Th e a c c u s e d a p p e a l e d h i s 
convictions contending, in part, that 
the gun was found during  an 
unreasonable search. He argued 
that the search was not authorized by  law, the 
driver’s apparent consent to the search was 
insufficient, and the stop and subsequent search was 
partially  motivated by racial bias. Thus, in his view, 
the gun should have  been excluded as evidence 
under s. 24(2).
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Whether or not a  person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy depends on the totality of the 
circumstances. Factors to consider the privacy 
analysis include the accused’s presence at the  time 
of the search; possession or control of the  property 
or place searched; ownership of the property or 
place; historical use of the property or item; ability 
to regulate access, including  the right to admit or 
exclude others from the place; the existence of a 
subjective expectation of privacy; and the objective 
reasonableness of that expectation. In this case, the 
Court of Appeal held the accused lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the car: 
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In the circumstances of the present case, the 
[accused] did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the car. The [accused] was a 
passenger in the vehicle at the time of the 
search, and he was authorized by his mother, at 
the very least, to be a passenger in the vehicle. 
However, the [accused’s] degree of possession or 
control, historical use, or ability to regulate 
access to the vehicle is unknown.
In general, it would be objectively reasonable 
for an individual using  a family member’s car to 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
vehicle. Here though, the [accused] did not 
identify himself as a person to whom the car had 
been loaned, and he did not indicate his 
connection to the vehicle’s owner. He was only 
a passenger in a vehicle driven by another 
person who claimed to have borrowed the car. 
Further, the police had no reason to believe that 
the [accused] had any connection to the vehicle 
other than as a passenger. Moreover, the driver 
wa s a t t emp t i ng  t o p roduce r equ i r ed 
documentation to police, and had apparent 
con t ro l o f t he veh i c l e . Unde r t he se 
circumstances, there is no basis for a person in 
the [accused’s] position to have subjectively 
expected privacy in the vehicle. [paras. 19-20]
Since the accused had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the car, there was no Charter “search” and 
therefore no s. 8  breach. It was unnecessary to 
address the issue of consent to search or determine 
whether the police conduct was reasonable. 
The Court of Appeal did note, however, that there 
was no statutory authority in Ontario permitting  the 
search of the vehicle  for proof of insurance. “Some 
provinces explicitly authorize the search of a vehicle 
where  an officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that the  vehicle is being  operated in violation of 
regulatory requirements,” said Justice  Pardu. 
“However, neither the Highway Traffic Act nor the 
Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act ... contains 
any such provision that is applicable in this case.”
Racial Bias
The accused submitted that the police stopped and 
searched the car because one or more of its 
occupants was black. In his view, this was a  random 
vehicle stop  of four black men without any apparent 
driving  misconduct. Further, there were some 
inconsistencies between the officer’s trial evidence, 
her notes, and her previous testimony that suggested 
the stop was racially motivated. A stop  or search 
motivated by racial bias or racial profiling  will 
breach the Charter. However, in this case, the trial 
judge did not err in finding  no such motivation. The 
officer gave evidence about when she first saw the 
vehicle and when she realized that one or more of 
the occupants was black. There was no basis to 
interfere with the trial judge’s findings of fact that the 
stop and search were not racially motivated. 
s. 24(2) - Admissibility
As for the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24
(2), even if there had been a Charter breach the trial 
judge did not err in concluding  that the gun should 
not be excluded. “Even if the [accused] had had 
some expectation of privacy in the vehicle, it was 
highly attenuated,” said Justice Pardu. “The officer 
acted in good faith. The trial judge found that she 
was not undertaking  a search for evidence of a 
crime, but was attempting  to help  the driver find 
proof of insurance. She asked the driver if he  wanted 
her help, and looked in the glove box in reliance on 
his consent. The societal interest in a trial on the 
merits was substantial. The  gun was highly reliable 
and probative evidence unaffected by any Charter 
breach.” 
The accused’s appeal against his conviction was 
dismissed. 




R. v. Italiano, 2015 ONCA 179
A police officer had previously 
received general information from 
two confidential informers that a man 
named Michele Santonato was a 
large scale drug  dealer, specifically in 
cocaine, and operated out of a house at 36 Celt 
Avenue in Toronto. While  watching  the house, the 
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police saw the accused Italiano enter it and emerge 
a few minutes later carrying  a  distinctive looking 
shoebox.  It was red and white with stripes. He 
entered his car and drove away. The police followed. 
About 15 minutes later, Italiano stopped his car and 
another man, the accused Abdul-Hamid got into the 
passenger seat. Abdul-Hamid then got out two 
minutes later holding  the  shoebox, entered his own 
car, and drove away.  The police followed Abdul-
Hamid, stopped him, and arrested him at 
gunpoint.  Following  the arrest, the vehicle was 
searched and the shoebox was found. It contained 
one kilogram of cocaine. The men were charged 
with drug offences.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Both men challenged Abdul-Hamid’s 
arrest and subsequent search on the basis 
that the arres t ing  of f icer lacked 
reasonable and probable grounds. Thus, 
the search incident to arrest was unlawful and the 
evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) 
of the Charter.  The judge described the test for 
reasonable grounds to arrest this way:
The Criminal Code of Canada and case law 
indicate that an arresting  officer must 
subjectively have reasonable and probable 
grounds, but those grounds must also be justified 
from an objective point of view. A reasonable 
person, placed in the position of the officer must 
be able to conclude there were reasonable and 
probable grounds for the arrest. Reasonable 
grounds can be equated to reasonable 
probability. They do not require that the police 
have a prima facie case before they effect an 
arrest ... . 
In format ion tha t would not meet the 
reasonableness standard on an application for a 
search warrant may still meet that standard in 
the context of an arrest.
The dynamics at play in an arrest situation are 
very different from those on an application for a 
search warrant. The decision to arrest often must 
be made quickly in volatile and changing 
situations. Judicial reflection is not a luxury the 
officers can afford. The police officer must often 
make a decision based on available information, 
which is often less than exact or complete. The 
law does not expect the same kind of inquiry of 
police as to whether to arrest someone that it 
demands of a justice faced with an application 
for a search warrant. 
There must be a constellation of objectively 
discernible facts amounting to reasonable and 
probable grounds for there to be a lawful arrest 
without warrant. 
The flow of investigative detention, arrest and 
search may be a dynamic process. A s. 8 analysis 
ought not to be reduced to an over-analytical 
parsing of events into static moments without 
practical regard to the overall picture. 
The totality of the circumstances relied upon by 
the arresting officer formed the basis for the 
objective assessment. It would be an error of law 
to assess each fact or observation in isolation. 
The objective assessment will include dynamics 
within which the officer acted and his or her 
experience. Because a trained officer is entitled 
to draw inferences and make deductions based 
on experience, a reviewing  court must take these 
factors into account. 
... ... ...
The cumulative effect of the factual elements 
may provide the objective support for the 
officer's subjective belief he had reasonable and 
probable grounds to arrest. The whole is greater 
than the sum of the individual parts. [references 
omitted, paras. 36-43, 2013 ONSC 1744]
In this case, the judge found the arresting  officers 
had sufficient reasonable  and probable grounds to 
make the arrest based on the information that they 
received, as well as from their observations and the 
surveillance conducted:
The information from the two confidential 
informants alone or the two confidential 
informants together but without everything else, 
would not be a lawful basis to arrest Mr. 
Santonato and that is not what is before me here. 
While the confidential informant information 
regarding  Mr. Santonato is not compelling, it has 
elements of credibility and corroboration. There 
is surveillance of Mr. Italiano which was a 
reasonable step for the officers to make from 
which they drew conclusions and they did not 
act in terms of arresting anyone until they saw 
the handoff to [Abdul-Hamid].
Volume 15 Issue 2 - March/April 2015
PAGE 9
In my view, having reviewed all of the evidence 
carefully, the confidential informant information, 
as corroborated to some extent by the 
surveillance, adds a layer to what was observed 
by the police and provides a basis for reasonable 
and probable grounds to arrest [Abdul-Hamid] 
and I find that they had those grounds. [paras. 
50-51, 2013 ONSC 1744] 
As for the search incidental to arrest, it was validly 
conducted:
Motor vehicles are legitimate objects of search, 
incident to arrest as they attract no heightened 
expectation of privacy that would justify an 
exemption from the usual common-law 
principles. The search must be truly incidental to 
the arrest. The police must be attempting to 
achieve some valid purpose connected to the 
arrest. It depends on what the police are looking 
for and why. The only requirement is that there 
be some reasonable basis for doing what the 
police did. The police have considerable leeway 
in circumstances of an arrest which they do not 
have in other situations. "Truly incidental to 
arrest" means if justification for the search is to 
find evidence, there must be some reasonable 
prospect of securing evidence of the offence for 
which the suspect is arrested. The limits on 
search, incident to arrest are no different for 
motor vehicles than for any other place. The 
right to search a vehicle, incident to arrest and 
the scope of the search will depend on a number 
of factors, including the basis for the arrest, the 
location of the car in relation to the place of 
arrest and other relevant circumstances. In this 
case, Mr. Abdul-Hamid was arrested, I have 
found, based on lawful authority. I find he did 
have a degree of expectation of privacy in the 
vehicle, but the police also had a power to 
search that vehicle, incident to arrest. In this 
case, the police were not on a fishing 
expedition. They were looking  for a very 
distinctive shoebox that had been very recently 
passed to the applicant. The item was observed 
and recovered on the floor in the rear passenger 
area. [The searching officer’s] evidence was that 
the box was not covered. This search was to 
achieve a valid purpose related to the arrest and 
provides evidence of the offence for which Mr. 
Abdul-Hamid was arrested. [para. 55, 2013 
ONSC 1744]
There were no ss. 8  or 9 Charter breaches, the 
evidence was admissible, and the accused Italiano 
and Abdul-Hamid were convicted of trafficking  and 
possessing cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Appeal
Both accused appealed their 
convictions arguing  the police  did 
not have reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest Abdul-Hamid and 
therefore the evidence out to have been excluded. In 
a short endorsement, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
upheld the trial judge’s ruling. 
The tr ial judge found that during the 
investigations the officers involved in the arrest, 
including  the arresting  officer and the officer 
who had the tip from the confidential 
informants, were part of an investigative team 
conducting surveillance and they kept in contact 
by radio. He concluded that based on the 
information regarding Santonato and the officers' 
observations, the arresting officer was entitled to 
order the arrest of Abdul-Hamid. We agree.
In our view, the arresting officer had the 
requisite reasonable and probable grounds to 
conduct the arrest. In this case, [the arresting 
officer] ordered the [accused] Abdul-Hamid’s 
arrest. At the time, this officer had received 
confidential information communicated through 
[another officer], that Santonato was a significant 
drug-dealer. [The arresting officer] could rely on 
a summary of the information given to him by 
[the other officer] in deciding  whether he had 
grounds to make the arrest.  Santonato was 
observed at 36 Celt Avenue. The [accused] 
Italiano went into 36 Celt Avenue and emerged 
a few minutes later with a shoebox. The shoebox 
was later seen in the [accused] Abdul-Hamid’s 
possession. He took it in his car and then 
left.  [The arresting officer], who ordered Abdul-
Hamid’s arrest, made most of these observations 
in person, and was informed of the rest by his 
fellow investigating officers.
The Court must consider the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether the 
constellation of factors taken together supports 
the officer’s reasonable and probable grounds.  
We are satisfied that the evidence established 
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the requisite reasonable and probable grounds 
relied on by [the arresting officer] to make the 
arrest. [paras. 6-8]
The appeal was dismissed and the convictions 
upheld.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note:  Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Abdul-Hamid, 2013 ONSC 1744.
PROTESTOR	 STOP	 &	 SEARCH	 
NOT	 JUSTIFIED
Figueiras v. Toronto (Police Services Board), 
2015 ONCA 208
During  the second day of the 2010 
G20 Summit of world leaders held in 
Toronto, the applicant and some of 
his friends went downtown to 
demonstrate in support of animal 
rights. As they walked they were stopped by a team 
of several police officers about one city block north 
of a security fence that had been set up  to enclose 
the summit site. They were told that if they wanted 
to cross the street and go any further, they would 
have to submit to a search of their bags. Although his 
companions complied, the applicant refused to 
permit a search of his backpack saying  he had 
nothing  to hide and regarded the request as a 
violation of his civil rights. At one point, the officer 
said, “Either we look through it, or you can go. 
What’s it going  to be?” When the applicant stated “I 
don’t consent to a search,” the officer stepped 
forward, wrapped his arm around the applicant’s 
shoulder, gripped him firmly by the shirt, pulled him 
in so they were face-to-face and said “You don’t get 
a choice.” The officer then pushed the applicant 
away and said, “Get moving.” Other comments 
made by police  included, “There’s no civil rights 
here  in this area. How many times do you got to be 
told that?” and “This ain’t Canada right now.” The 
applicant eventually gave up  his plans to 
demonstrate and went home. 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The applicant applied to the  Court for 
declarations that the police had violated 
his rights to freedom of expression, 
peaceful assembly, and liberty under ss. 2
(b)  and (c)  and 7 of the Charter. He also wanted  a 
declaration that the officer grabbing  him had 
committed the tort of battery. Although it was agreed 
that the officers had no statutory authority to 
demand the a search in this case, the judge 
nevertheless found it was authorized under the 
common law as an ancillary  police power. Targeting 
demonstrators walking  down the public  street and 
requiring  that they submit to a search of their 
belongings if they  wished to proceed fell within the 
general scope of the police duty to preserve the 
peace as well as their power to cordon off the  area 
to protect the foreign dignitaries.  As for the police 
action in fulfilling  these duties, the judge  found it 
was reasonably necessary. Tailoring  the searches to 
only  suspected demonstrators rendered the police 
intervention minimally intrusive and was not an 
abuse of authority. He also analogized these 
searches to those carried out at courthouses and 
airports. Finally, the alleged battery was de minimis 
(trifling) at worst and, in any event, was justified 
under s. 25 of the Criminal Code, which permits 
police to use “as much force  as is necessary” in the 
course  of their authorized duties when acting  on 
reasonable grounds.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The appl icant appealed the 
dismissal of his request for a 
declaration. He maintained that the 
police violated his Charter rights to 
liberty, freedom of expression, and peaceful 
assembly. 
Common Law Ancillary Powers Doctrine
Under the common law, police officers are given 
broad duties, such as preserving  the peace, 
preventing  crime and protecting  life and property, as 
well as powers ancillary to those duties. However, 
police powers ancillary to a police  duty are limited. “This ain’t Canada right now.”
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Ancillary police action must be reasonably 
necessary  in all of the circumstances for the carrying 
out of the police duty. In determining  whether police 
conduct falls within a common law ancillary power, 
the courts utilized a two-part analysis (also known as 
the Waterfield test):
1. Does the  police conduct in question fall within 
the general scope of any duty imposed on the 
officer by statute or common law?
2. If so, in the circumstances of the case, did the 
execution of the police conduct in question 
involve a justifiable use of the  powers 
associated with the engaged statutory or 
common law duty? Here, the  competing 
interest of the police duty and the liberty 
interests of the individual must be balanced. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal framed the police 
power exercised as “the power of individual police 
officers to target demonstrators and, where  no crime 
is being  investigated or believed to be  in progress, 
but with the intention of preventing  crime, to require 
that they submit to a search if they wish to proceed 
on foot down a public street.” As for the liberty 
interests at stake, they were identified as “the 
freedom of expression under the Charter and the 
common law right to travel unimpeded down a 
public highway.” 
The parties agreed that the officers’ conduct fell 
within the scope of the police duty to preserve the 
peace and prevent damage to property or persons. 
However, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the 
lower court that the  police conduct in interfering 
with the applicant’s liberty was necessary for the 
police to carry out their duty in keeping the peace. 
First, the power the police used was not effective. 
“Effectiveness in the context of police powers is not 
measured by whether a risk does or does not in fact 
materialize,” said Justice Rouleau speaking  for the 
Court of Appeal. “Rather, the effectiveness of a given 
power is determined by considering  whether, 
objectively, the measure serves to materially reduce 
the risk of a breach of the peace.” This team of 
police officers only targeted those who appeared to 
be protestors. Of the thousands of people downtown 
that day, only 70 to 100 were stopped. Furthermore, 
any would-be troublemakers who were turned back 
could have taken a different route  to get to the 
security fence.  
Second, the warrantless weapons searches of only 
those appearing  to be demonstrators were not 
rationally connected to their purpose of keeping  the 
peace: 
• It was unclear whether the previous day’s 
violence at the  Summit was initiated by 
demonstrators or others who had infiltrated and 
mixed with groups of demonstrators. 
• The previous day’s violence was not limited to 
the area near where the officer’s were. It 
occurred throughout the downtown core. 
• The previous day’s violence did not involve  the 
use of weapons that might be secreted in a 
backpack. Rather, uprooted newspaper boxes, 
street signs, sandwich boards, and bricks pried 
loose from a paved boulevard were used. 
Nor were the stops analogous to searches at 
courthouses. Unlike these searches, courthouse 
searches are  statutorily authorized, require everyone 
entering  submit, are publicized in advance, do not 
occur on a public street, and do not target 
identifiable groups. 
Justice Rouleau also found the lower court erred in 
the Waterfield balancing  exercise. For example, the 
judge equated minimal impairment on the 
applicant’s rights by only considering  the amount of 
people targeted by police (only apparent 
“Effectiveness in the context of police powers is not measured by whether a risk does or 
does not in fact materialize. Rather, the effectiveness of a given power is determined by 
considering whether, objectively, the measure serves to materially reduce the risk of a 
breach of the peace.” 
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demonstrators) rather than minimizing  the impact on 
those targeted:
The fact is that for a demonstrator such as Mr. 
Figueiras, the impairment of his rights was in no 
way lessened because the officers had 
determined to interfere with only the rights of 
people “like him.” The number of people who 
are the target of the intrusion is reduced, but the 
intrusion felt by each target is neither minimized 
nor reduced. The officers not only stopped and 
questioned would-be protesters, they also 
insisted that these would-be protesters submit to 
a search if they wished to proceed, regardless of 
the answers they gave in response to the officers’ 
questions. Additionally, it is arguable that by 
targeting demonstrators and making  it known 
that only demonstrators were being stopped and 
searched as a condition of passage, those 
stopped might justifiably feel an even greater 
sense of state interference, since they knew they 
were the only ones being  targeted. The decision 
to target demonstrators in no way lessens the 
impairment of Mr. Figueiras’s rights. [para. 24]
As a result, the Court of Appeal concluded that “the 
police did not have the power to target apparent 
demonstrators and require that they submit to a 
search in order to continue down a  public street.” 
The interference with the applicant’s liberty was not 
prescribed by law and therefore s. 1 of the Charter 
could not be used to justify the breaches. 
Battery
As for the police officer reaching  around the 
applicant and pulling  him in, this was more than “de 
minimis” touching, such as tapping  a person on the 
shoulder to get their attention. Here, the tort of 
battery, intentionally applying  unlawful force to the 
body of another, had been made out. “The contact 
with Mr. Figueiras in this case was more than just a 
‘de minimis’ touching,” said Justice Rouleau. “It was 
the kind of unnecessary manhandling  that, in my 
view, would offend the dignity of a person and serve 
to intimidate that person.”  Since the officer had no 
statutory or common law authority for his action, s. 
25(1) of the Criminal Code could not protect him in 
using force and shield him from civil liability. 
The applicant’s appeal was allowed and the Court of 
Appeal declared that the police violated the 
applicant’s common law right to travel unimpeded 
on a  public highway and his Charter  right to 
freedom of expression. The Court of Appeal also 
declared that the tort of battery had been committed 
against the applicant.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
ITO	 VALIDITY	 BASED	 ON	 ALL	 
INFORMATION
R. v. Whalen, 2015 NLCA 7
Two confidential informers stated that 
the accused (Denise Whalen)  was 
selling  prescription drugs, including 
Ritalin, morphine and Oxycontin, 
from her home. They told police  that 
people came to her front door to buy pills, 
completed the transactions very quickly, and then 
left. The sources gave the prices she charged for the 
pills, said how she acquired the drugs, and stated 
she kept them in a locked safe in her basement. 
Source  A, a  paid informer and admitted drug  user, 
had no criminal record and had been providing 
information for one month, which resulted in one 
arrest. Source A said that Denise lived at the address 
with “Billy”. Source A described “Billy” as having 
facial tattoos and a bluish/grey Montana van, which 
he parked in front of the house. Source B, a drug 
user with a criminal record (but no dishonesty or 
deceit offences), said they saw 10 to 15 drug 
transactions shortly before the search warrant was 
issued. Source B had been a confidential police 
informer for approximately 2½ years and provided 
intelligence on a regular and ongoing  basis 
regarding  criminal activity which was consistent 
with information received from others.  Source B’s 
past information, which he had been paid for, had 
led to the arrest of between five and ten individuals. 
That same day the police set up  a surveillance team 
and observed short visits by no fewer than eight 
people to Denise Whalen’s home over a period of 92 
minutes.  Searches of police data bases confirmed 
some of the information from Source A: Denise 
Whalen lived at the address with William “Billy” 
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Whalen and he had facial tattoos.  Police 
surveillance also confirmed that William Whalen 
kept his bluish/grey Montana van parked in front of 
the house, as stated by Source A. The police set out 
the information obtained from the two confidential 
informers, described as reliable, and from the police 
surveillance of Denise Whalen’s residence. A search 
warrant under s. 11 of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act was obtained. The police found 
drugs and both accused were  charged with drug 
possession offences. 
Newfoundland Provincial Court
The judge, reviewing  the warrant’s 
i s s u a n c e , c o n c l u d e d t h e r e  wa s 
insufficient grounds in the ITO for the 
warrant to be issued. First, he  gave little 
weight to the information provided by  Source A 
because  their past performance  was very limited 
(only  for a month). Source A couldn’t provide the 
Whalen’s surname, and it was unclear how they 
came upon the information or how they would have 
access to information that the drugs and cash were 
locked up  in a safe in the basement. Although the 
information regarding  the reliability of Source B was 
stronger, it was still insufficient to provide the basis 
for the  issuance of a  search warrant. Despite some 
corroboration by independent police database 
searches that the residence belonged to Denise 
Whalen, the police surveillance had not yielded any 
probative evidence of illegal activity.  The judge 
noted it was not possible to infer that two of the four 
females sighted entering  or leaving  the home were 
not residents and there was no corroborative 
evidence of illegal activity involving  Denise.  The 
judge quashed the search warrant and the evidence 
was excluded.
Newfoundland Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the warrant’s 
quashing. It argued that the  trial 
judge erred in concluding  there  was 
insufficient information in the ITO 
to support reasonable grounds to believe that an 
offence had been committed and that evidence of 
that offence would be found in Denise  Whalen’s 
house. 
Reasonable Search
A search will be “reasonable” under s. 8 of the 
Charter if it is authorized by law, the law itself is 
reasonable and the search is conducted in a 
reasonable manner. When a search warrant is 
properly issued the search is authorized by law and 
it is presumed to be valid unless the accused 
demonstrates its invalidity. Justice Barry, speaking  for 
the unanimous Court of Appeal, stated the test for 
reviewing  the validity of the search warrant as 
follows:
In reviewing whether a Provincial Court judge 
properly issued a search warrant, a reviewing 
judge must ask whether the accused has shown 
that there was no justifiable basis according  to 
law upon which the authorizing judge could 
have granted the warrant. In the present case this 
question comes down to whether the accused 
has shown that the authorizing  judge did not 
have sufficient credible information before him 
to establish reasonable grounds to believe that 
drugs were being trafficked from the Whalen 
residence at the time of issuing. [para. 18]
Reasonable Grounds
The concept of “reasonable grounds to believe” is 
“the point where credibly-based probability replaces 
suspicion”.  Grounds for a search must go beyond 
subjective belief and mere  suspicion. The proper test 
is one of “reasonable  probability” rather than “proof 
beyond a reasonable  doubt” or “prima facie case”.  
Nor is a judge reviewing  a search warrant to 
substitute their view for that of the issuing 
judge. Rather, the reviewing  judge is to show a high 
degree of deference to the issuing  judge by 
determining  whether the issuing  judge, on the basis 
of the record, could have granted the warrant. “A 
reviewing  judge  does not conduct a rehearing  of the 
application for a warrant,” said Justice Barry.  “The 
test is whether there was reliable evidence that 
might reasonably be believed on the basis of which 
the authorization could be issued.”
In assessing  whether there are reasonable grounds 
for a search warrant, the totality of circumstances in 
the ITO are  to be considered as a whole, not by 
“parsing  and microscopically examining  the words, 
phrases or paragraphs in isolation.” 
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Three concerns arise  when reviewing  the sufficiency 
of information set out in an ITO: was the information 
predicting  the  offence compelling, was the source of 
the information credible and was the information 
corroborated by police investigation. However, 
corroboration or confirmation of the offence itself is 
not required.
In this case, the information provided by source B 
was compelling  because it provided specific and 
convincing  detail regarding  Denise Whalen’s drug 
trafficking  activity including  what she was selling, 
where  and how she sold it, and how much she 
charged.  As for Source B’s credibility, it was strong: 
The source of the knowledge is the personal 
observation of “B”.   Indicia of the reliability of 
“B” are past performance over 2½ years as well 
as consistency with information obtained by 
police from other sources and, to some extent, 
consistency with searches of police data bases 
and with the brief surveillance.
In addition, the information supplied by Sources 
“A” and “B” provides some corroboration for 
each other’s statements. [paras. 40-41]
The credibility of Source B was also enhanced by 
certain corroborative information. First, although the 
information of Source A was less reliable than 
Source  B, there was some corroboration because of 
the similarity of the information regarding  the types 
of drugs, how they were sold, and where they are 
stored. Further:
There is also some corroboration from the 
comings and goings during the police 
surveillance, consistent with the brevity of the 
transactions described by the sources, even 
allowing for the fact that much of the activity 
may have been nothing more than that of a 
normal household.  At least four individuals 
made visits to the Whalen premises of such a 
short duration as to be consistent with the 
sources’ statements regarding the type of activity 
they observed.  Some further corroboration of 
neutral facts came from the police search of data 
bases, where the information of the sources 
regarding  the address of Ms. Whalen was 
confirmed, as well as the presence of Mr. 
Whalen and his vehicle. [para. 43] 
In this case, the trial judge substituted her opinion 
for that of the issuing  judge rather than asking 
whether there was a basis to issue the warrant. There 
was sufficient information in the ITO, in the totality 
of the circumstances, to establish reasonable 
grounds to believe that drugs would be present at 
the premises on the day the warrant was 
executed.  The reference by both sources to drugs 
and money being  kept in a safe in the basement, and 
the specific details regarding  the types of pills, 
moved the corroboration evidence beyond “general 
public knowledge.” It was also a reasonable 
inference from the information that Denise Whalen 
kept her stash “topped up” and that illegal 
prescription pills would be found when the warrant 
was executed. “Source ‘B’ supplied information 
which, considered with the other information, 
reached that point and permitted the authorizing 
judge to conclude it was sufficient to establish 
reasonable grounds to support issuing  a search 
warrant,” said Justice Barry. “There was sufficient 
credible  and reliable information in the ITO to justify 
the Provincial Court judge finding  reasonable 
grounds to believe an offence was being  committed 
and that evidence of that offence would be found at 
the specified time and place.”
  
The trial judge erred in quashing  the search warrant. 
The warrant was valid, there was no Charter breach, 
and therefore no basis to exclude the evidence 
found in the search. The Crown’s appeal was 
allowed and the matter was remitted for a new trial. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“A reviewing judge does not conduct a rehearing of the application for a warrant. The 
test is whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the basis 
of which the authorization could be issued.”
Sign up for the electronic distribution of “In 
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www.10-8.ca



























1,291In 2013 the total expenditure on policing was
$13,596,486,000
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Canada’s Police Officers by CMA - Top 9
CMA Officers % Change
Number per 100,000 2013>2014
Toronto, ON 9,875 167 -2.4%
Montreal, QC 7,420 186 +2.2%
Vancouver, BC 3,551 145 -4.0%
Calgary,  AB 2,201 160 -1.6%
Edmonton,  AB 1,998 155 -2.9%
Winnipeg, MN 1,535 191 -0.6%
Ottawa, ON 1,375 141 -2.5%
Hamilton, ON 1,120 153 +0.1%
Quebec, QC 1,018 1,363 -2.1%
POLICING	 ACROSS	 CANADA:	 
FACTS	 &	 FIGURES
According  to a  recent report 
released by Statistics Canada, 
there  were 68,896 active police 
officers across Canada in 2014. 
This represented a  decrease of 
354 officers over 2013, down 
1.6% from the previous year. Ontario had the most 
police officers at 26,148, while Nunavut had the least 
at 119. With a national population of 35,540,419, 
Canada’s average cop per pop  ratio was 194 police 
officers per 100,000 residents.  
Total population: 35,540,419
Source: Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 
2014, Catalogue no:  85-225-X, March 2015
2014
Volume 15 Issue 2 - March/April 2015
PAGE 16
GENDER
There were 14,175 female officers in 2014 
accounting  for 20.6% of all officers, or roughly  1 
in 5. This is up from 1.3% from the previous year. 
Q u e b e c h a d t h e h i g h e s t 
percentage of women (24.7%) 
while Nunavut had the lowest 
(8.4%). The RCMP HQ and 
Training  Academy were 26.6% 
female. 
The number of women in all 
ranks continued to rise. Senior 
officers, such as chiefs, deputy 
chiefs, superintendents, inspectors 
and other equivalent ranks, were 
10 .9% fema le , more than 
doubling  since 2004. Non-
commissioned officers, such as 
corporals, sergeants and staff 
sergeants, were 17.6% female, 
more than twice the 2003 
percentage. Constables were 
22.2% female. This was a slight 
increase over last year. 
Overall, the representation of 


















• Police expenditures rose for the 19th 
consecutive year, more than doubling  since 
1994.
• Per capita  costs for policing  in fiscal 2013 
translated to $387 per Canadian (capita).
• Among  provinces, the most spent on policing 
was in Ontario ($4,544,424,000) followed by 
Quebec ($2,550,320,000), British Columbia 
($1,504,0724,000), Alberta ($1,359,093,000) 
and Manitoba ($452,673,000). The Yukon 
($31 ,091 ,000 ) , P r ince Edward I s l and 
($34,765,000), Nunavut ($48,888,000) and the 
Northwest Territories ($58,584,000)  spent the 
least. Other RCMP expenditures on such things 
as HQ, international operations and national 
policing services amounted to $1,957,255,000.
2014	 FAST	 FACTS
• On the snapshot day of May 15, 2014 there 
were 68,896 police officers in Canada. There 
were an additional 28,409 civilians, which 
represented 29% of all police  personnel. There 
were 2.4 officers for every civilian employed. 
Canada’s authorized police strength on the 
snapshot day was 71,457. The difference 
between actual and authorized strength was due 
to unfilled vacancies. 
• Manitoba had the highest provincial rate of 
police strength at 206  officers per 100,000 
residents (cop to pop ratio). The Northwest 
Territories had the highest territorial cop to pop 
ratio at 440.
• 54% of police officers were 40 years of age or 
older. 11.5% of police officers were under 30 
while only 4.9% were 55 years or older.
• The Winnipeg, MB Census Metropolitan Area 
(CMA) had the highest police strength at 191 
officers per 100,000, followed by Thunder Bay, 
ON (187)  and Montreal, QC (186).  The CMA of 
Saguenay, QC had the lowest police  strength at 
106. 
• For the  2013 calendar year, 73% of officers 
hired were recruits. The remainder were 
experienced police officers.
• Recruits have a higher proportion of college 
certificates/diplomas than experienced officers.
• At the  end of the 2013 calendar year, 11% of 
police officers were  eligible to retire. 
Newfoundland had the highest proportion of 
officers that could retire at 22%. 
• In May, 2014 there were 84 Canadian police 
officers involved in several United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.
• Women represented 67% of civilians employed 
by police services. 
• Canada continues to have a lower cop to pop 
ratio (194) compared to other countries such as: 
• Ireland - 307.2
• Germany - 293.4
• France - 290.3
• Australia - 263.1
• United States - 221.8
• Sweden - 215.9 * based on 2012 stats
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RCMP
The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. It is divided into 15 Divisions 
with Headquarters in Ottawa. Each 
division is managed by a commanding 
officer and is designated alphabetically. 
RCMP On-Strength Establishment         
as of September 1, 2014







Corps Sergeant Major 3
Sergeants Major 3










RCMP Officers by Level of Policing - Canada 2014 (numbers do not include 1,111 members at HQ & Training Academy)
Level / Region BC AB SK MN ON QC NB NS PEI NL YK NWT NU Total
Municipal 3,464 1,079 118 182 - - 208 47 10 - - - - 5,108
Provincial 1,771 1,391 881 624 - - 475 760 96 400 109 168 106 6,781
Federal 745 317 227 174 1,663 913 134 171 23 83 18 14 6 4,488
Other 136 49 30 28 47 44 26 28 8 16 8 10 7 437
Total 6,116 2,836 1,256 1,008 1,710 957 843 1,006 137 499 135 192 119 16,814
RCMP DIVISIONS
Division Area
Depot Regina, SK (Training Academy)
National National Capital Region
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EVIDENCE	 ADMISSIBLE	 DESPITE	 
UNREASONABLE	 CELL	 PHONE	 
SEARCH
R. v. Adeshina, 2015 SKCA 29               
 
The police stopped a minivan after 
seeing  it travelling  144 km/h in a 100 
km/h zone. The accused was in the 
passenger seat. Police  conducted a 
database search and located an 
outstanding  warrant for the driver’s arrest. He was 
arrested, searched, and found to posses three  small 
plastic bags containing  white  powder, which 
appeared to be cocaine. The accused was then asked 
to step out of the minivan and searched. He was 
found to possess an LG cell phone and $1,444.71 in 
cash. The minivan was then searched and police 
discovered a Blackberry cell phone, a Samsung 
Galaxy cell phone, and a duffle-bag  containing  33 
Ziploc bags of marihuana having  a net weight of 
7,692 grams. The accused was then arrested for 
possessing  a controlled drug  for the purpose of 
trafficking. A cursory search of the text messages on 
the LG cell phone was made but nothing  of 
consequence to the investigation was discovered. 
More than 2½ months later the Samsung  Galaxy cell 
phone was removed from exhibit storage, its text 
messages were checked, and relevant information 
was recorded. Then, about four months later, the 
three  cell phones were sent to a Tech Crime Unit for 
examination. Nothing  was retrieved from the 
Blackberry or LG devices but a “data dump” of the 
Samsung  Galaxy resulted in a 682 page report about 
the data retrieved from its memory. This report 
revealed the Samsung  Galaxy belonged to the 
accused and that he was connected with the 
marihuana seized from the minivan. He was charged 
with possessing  marihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench
The officer explained that the 2½ month 
delay in searching  the Samsung  Galaxy 
resulted from him being  on leave for his 
wedding  and then being  busy on his 
return. Nevertheless, the judge found the searches 
conducted of the cell phone some months after the 
accused’s arrest was too far removed in time to be 
considered incidental to it. Thus s. 8 of the Charter 
had been breached. However, the judge refused to 
exclude as evidence all of the information acquired 
by the police from their searches of the cell phones. 
Although he found that the impact of the searches 
on the accused’s, Charter-protected interests had 
been significant, the judge found the Charter-
infringing  conduct of the police had not been 
serious and there was a clear societal interest in 
adjudicating  the case on the merits. Balancing  these 
three  factors, the judge concluded that the text 
messages should not be excluded under s. 24(2). The 
accused was convicted of possessing  marihuana for 
the purpose of trafficking  and possessing  proceeds of 
crime.
 
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal
The accused argued, among  other 
things, that the trial judge’s 
assessment under s. 24(2) was in 
error and that the text messages 
ought not to have been admitted as evidence. But 
the Court of Appeal disagreed. Conducting  its own 
assessment under the s. 24(2) admissibility analysis, 
the Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the 
evidence.
• Seriousness of the Charter-infringing state 
conduct (admission may send the message the 
ju s t i ce sy s tem condones se r ious s t a te 
misconduct). This was not serious:
1. The law respecting  cell phone searches at the 
time was unsettled and unclear.
2. This was not a deliberate Charter violation. 
The officer honestly believed, although 
wrongly, that he had lawful authority to 
conduct the searches and acted in a manner 
consistent with the general policy of his 
detachment on such matters. 
3. There were compelling  reasons to search cell 
phones in connection with drug  arrests and 
the officer could have obtained a warrant if he 
had sought one.
4. Although the forensics examination took place 
some months after the accused’s arrest, the 
officer offered a reasonable explanation for 
the delay.
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• Impact of the breach  on the Charter-protected 
interests of the accused (admission may send the 
message that individual rights count for little). This 
was very significant. The privacy interests in the 
contents of computers and mobile  devices like 
cell phones is high. The search of the Samsung 
Galaxy cell phone was particularly intrusive, 
involving a comprehensive “data dump”.
• Society’s interest in the adjudication of the 
case on its merits. The evidence of the Samsung 
Galaxy cell phone’s contents was reliable and real 
evidence connecting  the accused to the 
marihuana. It was extremely important to the 
Crown’s case and was key to the adjudication of 
the charges against the accused. There was a clear 
societal interest in seeing  this case adjudicated on 
its merits.
Chief Justice Richards, speaking  for the Appeal 
Court, found this case  tipped the balance against 
excluding  the evidence. The evidence  was 
admissible, the accused’s appeal was dismissed, and 
his convictions were upheld. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
PROPER	 ADVISEMENT	 MADE:	 
NO	 RIGHT	 TO	 RE-CHARTER
R. v. Bonnell, 2015 NBCA 6
  
About two months after a 16-year-old 
girl went missing, her 29-year-old first 
cousin was arrested on an unrelated 
charge of sexual assault. He was also a 
suspect in the death of his cousin. He 
was read an arrest script which conveyed his legal 
rights on both the unrelated sexual assault charge 
and being  the subject of a police investigation into 
the death of his cousin. He was advised of his right 
to counsel and warned about his right to silence. He 
was then transported to a police  detachment to 
facilitate his right to counsel. Despite being  urged to 
call a lawyer and told that murder was a serious 
crime, he refused to contact counsel. He was 
subsequently advised of his right to counsel three 
more times before being  interviewed the  following 
day. He later led police to the burial site of his 
cousin’s body in an isolated wilderness area and was 
charged with first degree murder.
New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused claimed that once the 
interview topic changed from the sexual 
assault investigation to the homicide, he 
should have been advised of his right to 
counsel relating  to the murder. The judge, however, 
disagreed and found that the accused had been 
clearly and repeatedly told he was the subject of a 
police investigation into the murder and kidnapping 
of his cousin, and indignities to her body. There was 
no change in his jeopardy in any legally  significant 
way. The police were therefore not obligated to 
provide further notice  of the right to counsel when 
questioning  changed form the alleged sexual assault 
to the murder. Thus, s.10(b)  of the Charter was not 
breached. His statements were admissible and he 
was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. He 
was sentenced to life  in prison with no eligibility for 
parole for 25 years.
 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The accu sed appea l ed h i s 
conviction arguing, among  other 
grounds, that his statements should 
not have  been admit ted as 
evidence because the police failed to advise  him 
that his legal jeopardy had changed when the first 
stage  of questioning  relating  to the alleged sexual 
assault was completed and questioning  about his 
cousin’s disappearance and suspected murder 
started. In his view, the police were required to stop 
the interview and provide him with further notice  of 
his Charter rights (re-advise him under s. 10(b)). The 
Crown, on the other hand, argued that the accused 
had been lawfully arrested and detained regarding 
the sexual assault allegation and lawfully detained 
regarding the murder investigation. 
Justice Quigg, writing  the Court of Appeal’s opinion, 
agreed with the trial judge that there had been no 
change in the accused’s jeopardy. He had been 
advised repeatedly that he was being  investigated for 
the murder of his cousin and of his rights as a result 
of that investigation. The evidence was properly 
admitted and the accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canli.org
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ALBERTA’s	 TOP	 COURT	 REFUSES	 
TO	 RECONSIDER	 SUSPENDING	 
s.	 10(b)	 RIGHTS	 DURING	 
IMPAIRED	 INVESTIGATION	 	 
R. v. Caswell, 2015 ABCA 97
 
A police officer stopped the accused 
driving  a truck. He thought the truck 
was in a  hurry and discovered the 
vehicle was registered to a woman. 
The officer told the accused he had 
pulled him over to check for sobriety and 
documentation. Although the accused said he had 
not been drinking, the officer noticed that he 
covered his mouth when he spoke, looked tired, and 
was slightly slurring  his speech. The officer also 
detected a moderate smell of alcohol on the 
accused’s breath. The officer told the accused he 
suspected that he may be impaired and radioed for 
another officer to bring  an approved screening 
device  (ASD). The accused was told to leave his cell 
phone in his truck when the officer asked him to the 
police vehicle. The ASD arrived within two minutes 
and the officer requested a  breath sample. The 
accused said he would not blow until he had spoken 
with his lawyer on his cell phone. After several 
minutes of discussion about calling  a lawyer, the 
accused was arrested for refusing  to provide a breath 
sample. After an hour he was released at the scene 
on a promise to appear but was never allowed to 
call a lawyer during  this time. His truck, which 
contained his cell phone, was towed and 
impounded under Alberta’s provincial administrative 
scheme.
Alberta Provincial Court
The officer testified he did not allow the 
accused to use his cell phone to call a 
lawyer because he had been taught that 
detained persons were not allowed to 
contact a lawyer when faced with an ASD demand. 
The judge found the officer had no duty to allow the 
accused an opportunity  to contact a lawyer before 
providing  a roadside sample. While s. 10(b) of the 
Charter guarantees the right to retain and instruct 
counsel without delay upon detention or arrest, she 
found the law was settled that s. 10(b) rights are 
suspended while a detained motorist is asked to 
participate  in roadside screening  tests. This s. 10(b) 
suspension is justified as a reasonable limit under s. 
1 of the Charter. She also rejected the arguments 
that she  could ignore binding  precedent (R. v. 
Mitchell, 1994 ABCA 369)  by reconsidering  earlier 
case  law in view of recent developments in cellular 
technology and should adopt a “reasonable 
accommodation” framework. Furthermore, even if 
there  was a s. 10(b) breach, the  judge ruled the 
accused’s refusal to comply with the ASD demand 
was nonetheless admissible. The accused was 
convicted of refusing to provide an ASD sample.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
An appeal judge upheld the trial judge’s 
ruling. The accused’s right to counsel had 
not been breached. The suspension of the 
right to consult a lawyer when a roadside 
breath demand is made is justified under s. 1 as long 
as the test can be done “forthwith”. The appeal 
judge found the societal objectives of detecting  and 
deterring  impaired driving  and the practical 
operational realities in doing  so continue to be 
relevant and improvements to cellular technology 
did not allow for a reconsideration of earlier 
precedent. Plus, even though it might have been 
possible  for the accused to access legal advice, the 
overall purpose and justification for suspending  the 
right to counsel during  roadside sobriety 
investigations remained. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed.
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused reques ted 
permission to further appeal 
his case and wanted the case 
o f Mitche l l , an ear l ie r 
decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal, to be 
reconsidered. In Mitchell, the suspension of the s. 10
(b)  right to counsel during  an investigative detention 
for impaired driving  was found to be justified under 
s. 1 of the Charter, irrespective of whether the right 
could be facilitated in the particular circumstances 
of the case. In the accused’s view, the trial judge 
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erred, among other things, in limiting  the scope of 
the s. 10(b) right to counsel upon investigative 
detention for impaired driving  to situations where 
the ASD test cannot be conducted forthwith. In 
seeking  a reconsideration of Mitchell, the accused 
argued:
• If a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel 
existed when the ASD demand was made, it 
should be on the Crown to establish in each 
case that the s. 10(b) suspension of the right to 
counsel was nevertheless justified pursuant to s 
1 of the Charter. 
• The meaning  of “forthwith” in s 254(2) of the 
Criminal Code  since Mitchell has been given a 
broad interpretation in the jurisprudence. 
• A provincial administrative scheme has added 
to the length of time a driver may be detained 
and has increased the severity  of the potential 
consequences flowing  from a roadside breath 
demand.
• The case law on the right to counsel has 
developed and the importance of this right has 
been emphasized.
The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
law was well settled in this area and the right to 
counsel is suspended during  ASD screening  so long 
as it is done “forthwith”. In the Crown’s view, the 
increased availability of cell phones did not detract 
from Parliament’s legitimate need to suspend the 
right to counsel in order to quickly and effectively 
implement roadside sobriety screening.  
The Majority
Justice Brown, writing  the two member majority 
decision, rejected the accused’s application to 
reconsider Mitchell. He summarized the limitation 
on the right to counsel while detained:
Parliament limited the right to consult counsel 
that would normally arise upon detention by 
imposing the requirement, contained in what is 
now section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, that a 
person reasonably suspected to have alcohol or 
a drug in his or her body and who has operated 
a motor vehicle within the preceding three hours 
comply with a peace officer’s demand to provide 
forthwith a sample of breath for analysis by an 
approved roads ide sc reen ing dev ice . 
Parliament’s point, recognized in [R. v. Thomsen, 
[1988] 1 SCR 640], was that a roadside 
screening device test is to be administered “at 
such time and place as the motorist is stopped, 
and as quickly as possible”. And, owing  to (inter 
alia) the strong  possibility of detection of 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
WHAT MITCHELL SAID
“We do not read [Thomsen and other 
Supreme Court decisions] as saying 
that where communications are 
difficult the police need not allow 
access to a lawyer before demanding a roadside 
screening sample. We read them as saying that 
Parliament requires motorists to give roadside 
screening samples without any chance to obtain legal 
advice first, and that any violation of the Charter is 
pardoned by s. 1 of the Charter.
It is not for us to disregard decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. For a lower court to disregard law 
laid down by higher courts because the lower court 
thinks that the reasoning or criteria lack force at 
different places or different times, is largely to ignore 
the doctrine of precedent. We cannot and will not do 
that. …
… And we think that the Supreme Court …, when 
deciding those cases, were perfectly aware that police 
sometimes stop motorists for investigation of 
possible impaired driving at times and in places 
where communication with a lawyer might be 
possible. … Even in 1988 … car telephones were fairly 
common.” – Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. Mitchell, 
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impaired drivers and to the deterrent effect of the 
perceived risk of their detection, the Supreme 
Court was satisfied that the consequent 
imposition upon the right to counsel was 
reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society, having regard to the fact 
that the right to counsel would be operative at 
the more serious breathalyzer stage. [references 
omitted, para. 30]
In the majority’s view, the changes to the legislative 
scheme and the proliferation (if not ubiquity)  of cell 
phones was neither a significant development in the 
law, nor was it a change in circumstances or 
evidence that has shifted the parameters of the 
debate in a  fundamental way such that Mitchell (and 
thus Thomsen) should be reconsidered:
As to the amendments to the pertinent legislative 
scheme, “significance” must be considered with 
reference to the rationale for the rule that 
scheme establishes. While the legislative 
changes which the [accused] points to (notably, 
provincial statutory amendments authorizing 
seizing and impounding of vehicles) have 
obviously increased the stakes for someone in 
the [accused’s] position, they are not relevant to 
the rationale for the decision in Mitchell (nor, for 
that matter, for the rule in Thomsen). [para. 42]
And further:
The proliferation of cell phones, however, does 
nothing  to invalidate that starting  premise in 
Mitchell and Thomsen. Even where a cell phone 
is present, the requirement to provide a breath 
sample forthwith is inconsistent with the right to 
consult counsel, so long as such consultation 
delays the immediate provision of a breath 
sample upon demand. The applicant’s case – in 
which approximately two minutes passed 
between the demand and the arrival of the 
screening device – does not demonstrate 
otherwise. While he stresses that he had a cell 
phone, and repeatedly asked to use it to contact 
a lawyer, no suggestion was made to us that he 
could necessarily have used it to (1) contact a 
lawyer, (2) instruct a lawyer and (3) have a 
reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice 
from a lawyer, all before the arrival of the 
screening device. [para. 44]
This ground of appeal was dismissed. 
A Different View
Justice Veldhuis would have granted the accused’s 
leave to appeal and allow Mitchell to be 
reconsidered:
[The Mitchell] decision is 20 years old; since the 
case was decided there have been many relevant 
and significant advances in technology allowing 
instantaneous communication; changes to the 
legislative scheme; it is a memorandum of 
judgment rather than a reserved judgment; and a 
number of subsequent appellate decisions have 
established exceptions to the general rule set out 
in Mitchell. This is a situation where the matter 
can be revisited based on developments in the 
law and a change in circumstances that 
fundamentally shifts the parameters of the 
debate. Cell phones have profoundly altered the 
“Parliament limited the right to consult counsel that would normally arise upon detention 
by imposing the requirement, contained in what is now section 254(2) of the Criminal 
Code, that a person reasonably suspected to have alcohol or a drug in his or her body 
and who has operated a motor vehicle within the preceding three hours comply with a 
peace officer’s demand to provide forthwith a sample of breath for analysis by an 
approved roadside screening device.”
“Even where a cell phone is present, the requirement to provide a breath sample forthwith 
is inconsistent with the right to consult counsel, so long as such consultation delays the 
immediate provision of a breath sample upon demand.” 
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way of life of Canadian society and certainly the 
post-1994 generation. [references omitted, para. 
15]
Justice Veldhuis opined that this ground of appeal 
was reasonably arguable and it was clearly an issue 
of substantial public importance.
Appeal Allowed On Other Grounds
Permission for the accused to appeal his other 
grounds was allowed by all three judges of the Court 
of Appeal: 
• whether evidence of his refusal while his right 
to counsel was suspended could be used as 
evidence for a criminal conviction.
• whether his s. 10(b)  right was breached when 
the police failed to facilitate  his right to counsel 
in the hour between his arrest and release on a 
promise to appear. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ACQUIRING	 HISTORICAL	 TEXT	 
MESSAGES	 DID	 NOT	 REQUIRE	 
PART	 VI
R. v. Belcourt, 2015 BCCA 126
While investigating  a home invasion 
style robbery where a man was shot 
dead, the police obtained two 
production orders under s. 487.012 of 
the Criminal Code requiring  Telus to 
produce all incoming  and outgoing  text messages 
sent at or around the time of the offence related to 
two cellular phones −  one associated with the 
accused and the other to another suspect. Some of 
the text messages included evidence relevant to the 
incident. The accused and the other man were 
charged with, among  other things, second degree 
murder. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The accused argued that the police  were 
required to obtain an authorization 
under Part VI of the Criminal Code  to 
lawfully acquire the text messages, 
rather than a production order as they did. In his 
view, the acquisition of any text messages could 
only  be authorized under Part VI because all the text 
messages were “private communications” that were 
“intercepted” within the meaning  of s. 183 of the 
Criminal Code. Thus, the text messages could not be 
acquired by police without giving  the accused the 
benefit of the privacy protections in ss. 185 and 186. 
The judge, noting  that Telus kept copies of the text 
messages on its database for about 150 days and 
was legislatively allowed to do so, found the seizure 
of the  messages under the production orders was not 
an interception within the meaning  of Part VI. This 
was not a prospective acquisition of future text 
messages as found in R. v. Telus, 2013  SCC 16, but 
the stored text messages had already been 
transmitted and received more than a month before 
the production order was granted. And, even if the 
acquisition of the text messages breached s. 8  of the 
Charter, the judge would have admitted them under 
s. 24(2). The accused was found guilty of second 
degree murder.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed, in part, 
arguing  that the trial judge erred in 
not excluding  the  text messages 
under the Charter. In his view, the 
production orders allowing  the police to acquire his 
stored text messages from the service provider’s 
database fell within the  definition of “interception.” 
Again, he contended that only Part VI could 
authorize the acquiring of the text messages. 
Justice Kirkpatrick, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
concluded that the seeking  of stored messages in this 
case was not “prospective”: 
... I appreciate the privacy concerns arising from 
technology that allows for text messages to be 
“stored” in a database before they are received 
by the intended recipient. However, as I 
understand the evidence, there is a five day 
“push period” during  which the service provider 
attempts to deliver messages and during  which 
the text message is stored electronically on the 
server without having  been delivered to the 
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intended recipient. In this regard, the most 
notable feature of the electronic storage is that it 
allows for the message to be continuously and 
instantaneously re-sent until either it is received 
or a pre-set time occurs (i.e., the “push period” 
ends).
I readily concede that the acquisition of a text 
message by the police in this interim transit 
period could constitute an interception within 
the plain meaning of the word. However, this is 
because the recipient has yet to receive the 
message, and may never receive the message. In 
stepping between a sender and recipient to 
acquire a message and its content before it is 
received, and when it may never be received, 
the police are “intercepting” the message in the 
most literal sense of the word. [paras. 44-45]
Here, however, the police did not “interject 
themselves in the communication process by using 
an investigative technique that comes between the 
sender and receiver of a message.” Rather, they 
sought “to obtain a stored electronic record of a text 
message after it has been sent and received.” Since 
the stored, historical messages were already in 
existence, the investigative  technique in obtaining 
them was not “prospective” and was outside the 
ambit of Part VI:
The detailed requirements found in Part VI exist 
to address the fact that the evidence sought to be 
acquired by the police has not yet come into 
existence at the time that the judicial 
authorization for its acquisition is being  sought. 
Indeed, the constitutionality of Part VI derives 
from the safeguards that are imposed by the role 
of the judge granting  the authorization, which 
exist because of the danger that the interception 
of private communications could easily 
transform into a fishing expedition. Put simply, it 
is inherent in the nature of Part VI authorization 
that the investigative technique to be utilized by 
the police is prospective, which requires a 
distinct form of judicial authorization in 
comparison to other search warrant provisions. 
In my view, applying Part VI to evidence already 
in existence is a misapprehension of the form of 
authorization provided for in that section of the 
Code. [references omitted, para. 47]
The use of the production order in this case did not 
amount to a breach under s. 8  of the  Charter. 
“Privacy rights are not absolute,” said Justice 
Kirkpatrick. “In this case, the acquisition of the 
historical text messages by police was authorized by 
law by way of s. 487.012.” Since there was no 
Charter violation there was no need to consider s. 
24(2). The accused's appeal was allowed, however, 
on the basis that the  trial judge erred by improperly 
instructing the jury on the murder charge.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
TECHNICAL	 BREACH	 DID	 NOT	 
WARRANT	 EXCLUSION	 OF	 
EVIDENCE
R. v. Shin, 2015 ONCA 189
During  a street-level undercover 
cocaine trafficking  investigation 
dubbed Project Isis, the accused 
became a target of the investigation 
based on evidence linking  him to 
other traffickers. Police observed these traffickers 
entering  an apartment building  several times over a 
two month period, where they generally stayed for 
only  a few minutes.  As a  result of this police 
surveillance and the execution of general warrants 
authorizing  covert entries into the traffickers’ 
residences, the police believed that the apartment 
was being  used as a “stash house”.  Based on 
surveillance and other information, the police 
sought a  general warrant authorizing  covert entry 
into the apartment to, among  other things, search it 
and seize drugs and other items. The general warrant 
authorized the police to:
covertly enter [the Apartment]…[t]o  search  the 
premises or storage unit for, to  photograph, and to 
alter or seize any firearms, ammunition, controlled 
drugs, proceeds of crime (cash) and any other 
information about, or evidence, of the above-noted 
offences, including drug packaging, cocaine 
adulterants, debt lists, weigh scales, cellular 
telephones or telephone records, banking 
documents, documents relating to the occupancy 
of the residence and photographs of the co-
conspirators.
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The police entered the apartment, which was 
unoccupied, opened a locked bedroom door, and 
found powder cocaine (2369.2 grams), crack 
cocaine (81.3  grams), methamphetamine (6.1 
grams), heroin (2.8  grams), hashish (525.7 grams), 
marijuana (7454.3  grams), cash ($235,335), and 
drug  trafficking  paraphernalia. This included a 
money counter, digital scales, a vacuum sealer and 
vacuum seal packaging, latex  gloves, empty 
packaging, and cocaine cutting  agent. All of the 
substances were seized and removed from the 
apartment. However, three officers remained in the 
apartment in case the accused returned. The time set 
out in the warrant had not yet expired. 
About half an hour after the seized items had been 
removed from the apartment, the accused entered, 
using  keys which also opened the locked bedroom 
door.  Police immediately arrested him and seized 
the keys, which he had dropped on the floor during 
his arrest. His car was searched incident to arrest. In 
it, police  found documentation in his name, 
marijuana (4865.3 grams), and $5,200 in cash. He 
was advised of his right to counsel moments after his 
arrest and immediately indicated he wanted to 
speak with a lawyer. However, the arresting  officer 
began to question him. The accused said that the 
apartment was his, that there was marijuana in his 
car, and he gave the password to his cell phone. He 
was taken to a police station and told he could not 
contact his lawyer until the investigation was 
complete. He was not permitted to contact counsel 
for about six hours.  Three hours of that delay was 
due to the execution of other warrants for Project 
Isis and the other three hours of delay  was because  a 
new warrant was needed to address a mistake in it. 
The accused was charged with possessing 
marijuana, cocaine and heroin for the purpose of 
trafficking, and possessing  proceeds of crime over 
$5,000.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Police testified that they believed the 
warrant permitted them to remain in the 
apartment to see if anyone entered it. 
Such an observation, in their view, 
would constitute information about the offence, 
which the  warrant permitted them to gather. Officers 
also said they believed they had grounds to arrest 
the accused and to search his car incident to arrest. 
The lead detective testified that he directed the 
accused not be permitted to contact counsel. He 
wanted to ensure officer safety and the protection of 
evidence during  the execution of various search 
warrants as part of Project Isis. 
The accused sought the exclusion of the  items 
seized from the apartment and his car. He also 
wanted the observations that the police made of him 
as he came through the front door using  his keys to 
enter the apartment, the data  seized from his cell 
phone on his arrest, and the statements he made 
immediately following  his arrest ruled inadmissible. 
The judge did find several Charter violations:
• s. 8 - the warrant did not authorize the police 
to remain in the apartment and wait for the 
accused to return after they  had seized the 
evidence; therefore the search was conducted 
in an unreasonable manner. 
• s. 10(b)  - the police delayed the exercise of the 
accused’s right to counsel.  
• ss. 8 and 10(b)  - the police questioned the 
accused after he indicated he wished to 
exercise his right to counsel.
The accused’s statements following  his arrest were 
excluded. The data  from his cell phone seized at the 
time of his arrest was also inadmissible  because of 
the improper questioning  which led him to reveal 
the password.  The other evidence, however, was 
admitted under s. 24(2). First, there was no bad faith 
on the part of the police. Second, there had been a 
minimal impact on the accused’s Charter-protected 
interests when the police overstayed in the 
apartment. The accused had a  minimal expectation 
of privacy in the apartment (it was not his residence 
nor was it a  dwelling-place)  and the police had 
lawfully  entered it to seize drugs and other 
evidence. Remaining  in the  apartment after the 
evidence had been removed was merely a technical 
breach. Finally, society’s interest in adjudicating  the 
case on its merits favoured admission of the 
evidence. Most of the evidence was lawfully 
obtained, highly reliable, crucial to the Crown’s 
case, and its admission would not bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute. Thus, only 
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the accused’s statements to the police following  his 
arrest and the data from his cell phone were 
excluded. A jury convicted the  accused of 
possessing  marijuana for the purpose of trafficking 
and possessing  proceeds of crime over $5,000. He 
was sentenced to six years in prison.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accu sed appea l ed h i s 
convictions by arguing, among 
other grounds, that the trial judge 
failed to exclude the evidence of 
his entrance to the  apartment under s. 24(2). His 
possession and use of the keys was evidence about 
his knowledge and control over the apartment. He 
contended that the trial judge failed to properly 
consider the admissibility  of this evidence and, had 
he done so, it would have been excluded.
Justice Gillese, delivering  the Court of Appeal’s 
opinion, concluded that the trial judge properly 
considered the key entry evidence. However, even if 
he hadn’t, the result would have been the same - 
admission of the evidence:
The Crown has conceded that the Warrant did 
not authorize the police to remain in the 
A p a r t m e n t a f t e r t h e s e a r c h a n d 
seizure. Assuming  that the police conduct was 
overreaching, I do not find it to be a serious 
breach.  Their conduct in remaining in the 
Apartment to determine who had possession of 
the drugs and cash was logically and reasonably 
connected to the core of the authorization under 
the Warrant. Furthermore, on the findings of the 
application judge, the police off icers’ 
overstaying was not in bad faith and was not a 
deliberate violation of the Warrant.  The 
overstaying was short in duration, occurred 
within the time that the Warrant authorized the 
police to be inside the Apartment, was done 
without the intention of breaching the terms of 
the Warrant, was a technique for which ample 
grounds existed, entailed no breach of privacy 
beyond that authorized by the Warrant, and was 
intended to end the investigation with an arrest 
in a safe and controlled manner.
Accordingly, I view the breach to be honest, 
minor and technical in nature, falling  at the less 
serious end of the spectrum. The admission of 
“evidence obtained through inadvertent or 
minor violations of the Charter may minimally 
undermine public confidence in the rule of 
law”. Furthermore, the absence of bad faith 
reduces the court’s need to disassociate itself 
from the police conduct.  I do not find that the 
over s tay ing  would tend to b r ing the 
administration of justice into disrepute.Second, 
the court must consider the impact of the breach 
on the [accused’s] Charter-protected interests. In 
this case, there can be no serious challenge to 
the application judge’s finding that the [accused] 
had a diminished expectation of privacy in the 
stash house.  A dwelling used solely for the 
commercial trade in drugs attracts a diminished 
privacy interest. The Apartment was a storage 
and packaging  facility for drugs and the illicit 
proceeds of trafficking in drugs.
The Warrant authorized the police to enter the 
Apartment, conduct an invasive search and 
create property damage.  There is nothing  to 
suggest that the officers acted improperly in the 
short period between the seizure of drugs and 
money, and the [accused’s] arrival at the 
Apartment.  In these circumstances, staying 
inside the Apartment for a short while longer 
than was authorized is a minimal intrusion.  
Furthermore, the police gained no special or 
private information by remaining  inside the 
Apartment.  Had they waited in the corridor 
outside the Apartment or followed the [accused] 
to it, they would have seen the [accused] use his 
keys to enter the Apartment. Thus, in my view, 
the impact of the overstaying on the [accused’s] 
Charter-protected rights was minimal.
Third, the court must consider society’s interest 
in the adjudication of the case on its merits.  
These were very serious crimes. The keyed entry 
evidence was real and reliable.  In my view, the 
third Grant factor points squarely to admission 
of the keyed entry evidence. [references 
omitted, paras. 66-70]
On balancing  the three admissibility factors, the 
Court of Appeal found the admission of the key 
entry  evidence would not bring  the administration of 
justice into disrepute.  The accused’s conviction 
against his appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
Volume 15 Issue 2 - March/April 2015
PAGE 28
ON-DUTY	 DEATHS	 DROP
On-duty peace officer deaths in 
Canada decreased by one last year 
over 2013. In 2014 five peace 
officers lost their lives on the job  as 
reported by the Officer Down 
Memorial Page. 
Guns, posed the greatest risk to officers last year. 
Since 2005, 16 officers have lost their lives to 
gunfire. However, circumstances involving  vehicles, 
including  automobile accidents (16), vehicular 
assault (5) and being  struck by  a vehicle (2), posed 
the most risk to officers over the last decade. These 
deaths account for nearly 43% of all on-duty deaths, 
which is much higher than the next leading  cause of 
gunfire in the same 10 year period. On average, five 
officers have lost their lives every year during  the  last 
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Thunder	 Bay	 Police	 Service,	 ON
End	 of	 Watch:	 May	 7,	 2014
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Constable	 Fabrice	 Georges	 Gevaudan
Royal	 Canadian	 Mounted	 Police,	 NB
End	 of	 Watch:	 June	 4,	 2014







































































































































































2014 Average Tour: 14 years
2014 Average Age: 42
2014 Deaths by Gender: female - 1
    male - 4
2014 Deaths by Province:
✴ New Brunswick - 3
✴ Manitoba - 1
✴ Ontario - 1
Constable	 Douglas	 James	 Larche
Royal	 Canadian	 Mounted	 Police,	 NB
End	 of	 Watch 	 June	 4,	 2014









./# 01234# 56# 5++7# 85,9:12,;<=#
(;/>?1@<:#A1/B:<#C:>>B:2# ;D# ?4:# E1F1<#
G;<B3:# A:H 2?I:/?# J1> D1?1<<9# >4;?
=K2B/L#1#=2KL#@K>?#B/#M2;>>12=6 NK:@:3O
PB># H12?/:2# (;/>?1@<:# $?:H41/:#
Q;2@:>#J1>#J;K/=:=#B/#?4 #12IO
(;/>?1@<:>#C:>>B:2#1/=#Q;2@:>#41=#
@::/# H12?# ;D# 1# <12L:# >BIK<?1/:;K>#








(;/>?1@<:# C:>>B:2# B># >K2FBF:=# @9# 4B>#
JBD:6# J4;# 1<>;# >:2F:># 1># 1# H;<B3:#
3;/>?1@<:6# 1/=# ?J;# 9;K/L# =1KL4?:2>#
1L:>#*+#1/=#*5O
















# # A:3:I@ 2#*86#5++U
# # E1F1<#G;<B3:#A:H12?I:/?
#























* * * !"#$%&'()*C) #3$*>%,"#1D/3((
# # # A:3:I@:2#5*6#5++*#
# # # &(0G#01/B?;@1
# # # !"#$%&'()*5/,1)#*>))@&(0
# # # 01234#U6#5++*
# # # &(0G#"K/1FK?


























































































2014 Deaths by Cause:
✴ gunfire - 3
✴ heart attack - 1
✴ automobile accident - 1
Last 10 years by Gender: 
✴ female - 7
✴ male - 46
“They Are Our Heroes. We Shall Not Forget Them.”
Source: http://canada.odmp.org [accessed April 17, 2015]
Constable	 David	 Ross
Royal	 Canadian	 Mounted	 Police,	 NB
End	 of	 Watch:	 June	 4,	 2014
Cause	 of	 Death:	 Gunfire
Corrections	 Officer	 Rhonda	 Commodore
Manitoba	 Corrections,	 MB
End	 of	 Watch:	 November	 6,	 2014
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Canadian Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths (by cause & year)
Cause 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total
Aircraft accident 2 2
Assault 1 1
Auto accident 1 2 3 3 3 1 1 2 16
Drowned 1 1 1 3
Duty related illness 1 1
Gunfire 3 1 1 3 3 5 16
Heart attack 1 1 1 3
Natural disaster 2 2
Stabbed 1 1
Struck by vehicle 1 1 2
Training accident 1 1
Vehicular assault 1 2 1 1 5
Total 7 6 5 3 7 4 2 4 6 11 53
Female 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 7
Male 4 5 4 3 6 3 2 4 5 10 46
PEACE	 OFFICER	 ASSAULTS
According  to a Statistics Canada report, “Police-
reported crime statistics in  Canada, 2013,” 
assaulting  a peace officer dropped (-11%) from 
2012 to 2013. In 2013  there were 9,722 assault 
peace officer offences compared to 10,776 the 
previous year. From 2003  to 2013, assaults against 
peace officers have dropped 1%. 
For other assaults in 2013, there were:
• 158,090 reports of common assault (level 1).
➡ down 8% from 2012.
• 45,672 assaults with a weapon or bodily harm 
(level 2).
➡  down 9% from 2012.
• 3,190 offences of aggravated assault (level 3). 
➡ down -11% from 2012.
13%
87%
On-Duty Deaths 2005-2014 by Gender
Male
Female
Source: Statistics Canada, 2014, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2013”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 23, 2014.
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U.S. Peace Officer On-Duty Deaths
Cause 2014 2013
911 related illness 1 6
Aircraft accident - 1
Assault 2 -
Automobile accident 26 25
Boating Accident - 1
Bomb - 1
Drowned 2 2





Gunfire (accidental) 2 2
Heart attack 19 10
Motorcycle accident 4 5
Stabbed - 2
Struck by vehicle 5 8
Training accident - 2
Vehicle pursuit 5 4
Vehicular assault 10 5
Total 127 114
U.S. On-Duty Deaths by Year (2005-2014)
Year 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 Total
Deaths 127 114 121 180 177 140 160 204 161 166 1550
Avg. age 40 43 42 41 42 40 40 40 38 39




















Female 4 7 12 12 10 3 15 9 9 5 86
Male 123 114 121 168 167 137 145 194 152 161 1482
U.S. ON-DUTY DEATHS RISE
During  2014 the U.S. lost 127 
peace officers, up 13 from 2013. 
The top  cause of death was 
gun f i r e ( 47 )  f o l l owed by 
automobile accidents (26), heart 
attack (19), being  struck by  a 
vehicle (5), and vehicle pursuits 
(5). 
California lost the most officers in 2014 at 15 - followed by Texas 
and New York at 11 each, the U.S. Government (7), Florida (6), 
Puerto Rico (5), Tennessee (5), 
Alabama (4), Georgia (4), 
Indiana (4), New Jersey (4), 
and Pennsylvania  (3). The 
average age of deceased 
officers was 40 years while the 
average tour of duty was 12 
years and three months. Men 
accounted for 97% of U.S. 
officer deaths while  women 





Source: http://www.odmp.org/year.php [accessed April 17, 2015]
“It Is Not How These Officers 
Died That Made Them Heroes. 
It Is How They Lived.”
Inscription at the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial,
Washington, D.C.
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BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF PUBLIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options.  
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca  
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
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Expand your credentials and advance your career with 
these online graduate certi!cates. Learn through real world 
challenges, current cases, curriculum and techniques. 
Gain the specialized theoretical foundation and applied skills 
to function successfully as an analyst.
604.528.5843 JIBC.ca/graduatestudies
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
